Imagine this: three trucks loaded with fresh chicken breast arrive at a meat processor in France. The cargo is perfectly chilled, neatly packaged, and completely intact. Yet the entire shipment is rejected. The reason? Maggots, metal particles, and wood splinters are found in the trailers\u2014not in the chicken, but in the cargo area. The result is disastrous: over \u20ac213,000 in damages because the shipments can now only be sold as frozen products. The question addressed by the Arnhem-Leeuwarden Court of Appeal in its ruling of April 28, 2026 (ECLI:NL:GHARL:2026:2638) is: is this the carrier\u2019s problem?<\/p>\n
Chicken producer Plukon enlists logistics service provider DFDS to transport three shipments of fresh chicken breast to France by road. The chicken is packed in Dolavs\u2014large plastic containers weighing approximately 1,000 kilograms, sealed on the inside with a folded plastic bag.<\/p>\n
Upon arrival, the customer discovers maggots, metal particles, and wood splinters in the trailers, one after another. Although it was later established that none of these contaminants had actually come into contact with the chicken, the buyer rejected all three shipments. The chicken was returned to the Netherlands. Due to the time lost, it could no longer be sold as a fresh product. The shipments were frozen and eventually sold, but at a significantly lower price. Plukon holds DFDS liable under Article 17(1) of the CMR.<\/p>\n
Article 17(1) of the CMR provides that the carrier is liable for total or partial loss of the goods and for damage occurring between the time of acceptance and delivery. In this case, everything revolves around the concept of \u201cdamage.\u201d<\/p>\n
Plukon argues that the cargo was damaged because its value decreased drastically during transport. The buyer\u2019s refusal to accept the shipment and the resulting return shipment mean that the chicken can no longer be sold as a fresh product. According to Plukon, that loss of value is sufficient.<\/p>\n
DFDS sees it differently. Damage requires physical impairment of the goods themselves\u2014and that is not the case here.<\/p>\n
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of DFDS.<\/p>\n
Because the CMR does not contain a definition of \u201cdamage,\u201d the court applies the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention: the ordinary meaning of the terms of the convention, read in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the convention. This leads to a clear conclusion:<\/p>\n
\u201cIn the court\u2019s view, \u2018damage\u2019 in the ordinary sense of the word can only be said to exist in the case of physical impairment. Damage is not the same as the broader concept of loss.\u201d<\/p>\n
According to the court, this interpretation is supported by several points of reference. The authentic English text refers to \u201cdamage thereto,\u201d which indicates damage to the goods themselves. Furthermore, the exceptions in Article 17(4)(d) of the CMR consistently relate to situations in which the goods are physically affected, for example, by their nature or packaging.<\/p>\n
Plukon also invokes Article 25 of the CMR, which governs the calculation of compensation in the event of damage. The court of appeals rejects that argument: Article 25 specifies how to calculate compensation when damage has occurred, but it does not define when damage is deemed to have occurred. First, it must be established that the goods have been damaged; only then does the calculation rule apply.<\/p>\n
Plukon further argues that the chicken suffered a loss of quality due to the passage of time during the return trip\u2014including moisture loss. That argument also fails.<\/p>\n
According to the court, the deterioration in quality was not directly caused by the transport itself, but by the return shipment. That return shipment was solely the result of the consignee\u2019s decision to refuse the shipment. Because that refusal was not based on damage within the meaning of the CMR, the required causal link is lacking.<\/p>\n
Plukon then attempts an alternative approach: DFDS allegedly breached a secondary contractual obligation by failing to provide clean trailers. This would constitute an independent breach of contract, separate from the CMR.<\/p>\n
The court of appeals did not agree. The use of clean trailers is not a separate contractual obligation, but rather the manner in which a carrier fulfills its primary obligation\u2014to transport and deliver with due care. Because the CMR exhaustively governs liability for loss, damage, and delay, there is no scope to recover the same damages from the carrier under national contract law. Plukon\u2019s claims are dismissed in their entirety.<\/p>\n
The court\u2019s message is clear: not every financial loss incurred during transport qualifies as cargo damage under the CMR. The concept of \u201cdamage\u201d has an autonomous and limited meaning. Economic loss of value alone is insufficient. As long as the goods themselves have not been physically damaged, there is no basis for the carrier\u2019s liability.<\/p>\n
For shippers and their insurers, this means they cannot automatically pass on the risk of refusal by buyers to the carrier. Anyone wishing to cover this type of risk would be wise to make explicit contractual arrangements in advance. According to the court, the CMR does not provide a safety net for this.<\/p>\n